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I. INTRODUCTION
In criminal prosecutions, particularly those involving crimes
that are regulatory in nature, one available defense is premised
upon the government having contemporaneous or prior knowl-
edge of illegal activity. This defense, known as criminal estoppel,
asks this question: "How can the government now say we commit-
ted a crime when they knew what we were doing all along?"
Criminal estoppel has the same fundamental appeal to the criminal
defendant as the plea, "Dad let me do it," has to a child when Mom
attempts punishment. The same equitable consideration is pres-
ent; if those responsible for enforcing the law are aware of the be-
havior and explicitly or implicitly condone it, what justice lies in
later punishing that behavior?
This Article explores the theoretical underpinnings of crimi-
nal estoppel and considers its application as an affirmative criminal
defense in various factual settings. Drawing from a recent federal
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) prosecution in Minnesota,1
this Article harmonizes the boundaries and the doctrinal bases of
the defense. Part II of this Article provides a brief overview of the
criminal estoppel defense. Part III examines various courts' inter-
pretations of criminal estoppel. Part IV explores cases in which de-
fendants cite the government's knowing acquiescence in order to
invoke the criminal estoppel defense. Part V considers the limits of
criminal estoppel. Part VI examines the standards by which a court
or jury must examine the criminal estoppel defense. Finally, Part
VII concludes that criminal estoppel will continue to evolve as a de-
fense in the modern climate of regulatory prosecutions.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE CRIMINAL ESTOPPEL DEFENSE
The defense of criminal estoppel ranges from the modest
claim that the defendant believed that the government was aware,
or should have been aware, of the defendant's criminal conduct,
2
to the assertion that the government not only was aware, but was
consulted and specifically approved of the defendant's criminal
conduct.3 Some defendants offer the criminal estoppel defense to
1. United States v. Najarian, 915 F. Supp. 1460 (D. Minn. 1996).
2. See, e.g., Najarian, 915 F. Supp. at 1473 (rejecting the defendant's con-
tention that the government should be estopped from prosecuting the defendant
for alleged conduct that the FDA had known about for years).
3. See, e.g., Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 425-26 (1959) (describing assurances
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create reasonable doubt about one of the elements of a charged
offense, such as whether there actually was misrepresentation, con-
cealment, or criminal intent.4 Procedurally, a defendant's goal is to
obtain ajury instruction on "entrapment by estoppel," the awkward
and inaccurate expression often applied to the defense.5
The United States Supreme Court has observed it is "indefen-
sible [to convict a citizen] for exercising a privilege which the state
clearly had told him was available to him."6 Manyjurists and schol-
ars agree that government approval of conduct is, and should be, a
defense to criminal charges.- The criminal estoppel defense draws
its philosophical basis from many sources, including an aversion to
entrapment,8 the protection of fundamental fairness or due proc-
ess9 with respect to adequate notice,' and statutory vagueness.1
by a state commission that the defendant could assert the privilege against self-
incrimination as a clear message of consent by the state); United States v. Hiland,
909 F.2d 1114, 1126 (8th Cir. 1990) (noting the defendant's contention that the
FDA affirmatively misled him to believe that his product could be marketed law-
fully without new drug approval).
4. See, e.g., United States v. Levin, 973 F.2d 463, 468-70 (6th Cir. 1992) (find-
ing that a government agency's declaration of legality must negate the existence
of criminal intent). At least one commentator has stated that criminal estoppel is
inconsistent with specific intent crimes and that no instruction should be given
whenever specific intent is an essential element of the offense. See Sean Connelly,
Bad Advice: The Entrapment by Estoppel Doctrine in Criminal Law, 48 U. MIAMI L. REv.
627, 638-39 (1994).
5. Rather than "entrapment by estoppel," this Article refers to the defense
as "criminal estoppel" in the broadest sense, so as to cover all of its variations.
6. Raley, 360 U.S. at 438.
7. See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW
§ 5.1(e) (2)-(3) (2d ed. 1986) (discussing one's reliance upon a statute, judicial
decision, or official interpretation as a defense); Frank C. Newman, Should Official
Advice Be Reliable? - Proposals as to Estoppel and Related Doctrines in Administrative
Law, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 374 (1953) (proposing a statute relieving liability for one
who acts in conformance with a written agency statement).
8. See Raley, 360 U.S. at 425-26 (refusing to sustain a conviction as it would
be an "indefensible sort of entrapment by the State").
9. See Connelly, supra note 4, at 632; see also United States v. Abcasis, 45 F.3d
39, 42-43 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Raley, 360 U.S. at 437, in support of the notion
that the Due Process Clause did not permit conviction when the defendant has
been entrapped); United States v. Smith, 940 F.2d 710, 714 (1st Cir. 1991) (hold-
ing that whether prosecution of the defendant violates his due process rights de-
pends upon the totality of the circumstances surrounding the prosecution, and
not solely upon whether the defendant was incorrectly informed or misled by the
government).
10. See United States v. Pennsylvania Indus. Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. 655, 674
(1973) (holding that traditional notions of fairness should preclude the govern-
ment from pursuing a criminal prosecution when the defendant was deprived of a
"fair warning" as to what conduct the government intended to make criminal);
State v. McKown, 475 N.W.2d 63, 68 (Minn. 1991) (holding that the indictment of
3
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The defense also is consistent with historical application of estop-
pel 2 and mitigates problems that stem from the absence of mens
rea in specific intent crimes. Central to these concerns is the issue
of whether the requisite knowledge is based either upon the
knowledge and conduct of the government agent, or upon the
knowledge, conduct, and beliefs of the defendant. 4
The two independent bases for the criminal estoppel defense
are objective due process and subjective reliance. 15  When faced
with the defense of criminal estoppel, courts and scholars stress ei-
ther: (1) objective evidence of communications to or from the
government agents or the setting of actual or apparent standards,
or (2) the subjective beliefs and actions of the defendant, based on
information or circumstances for which the government is respon-
sible. 16 A defense based on the former may emphasize the due
process issue and focus on the lack of adequate notice in a statu-
tory or regulatory scheme which has the capacity to mislead. 7 A
defense based upon the latter may emphasize the detrimental reli-
parents for the death of their child violated the parents' due process rights be-
cause the prosecuting statute failed to give fair notice of prohibited conduct).
11. See Raley, 360 U.S. at 438 (citing Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451
(1939)) ("A state may not issue commands to its citizens, under criminal sanc-
tions, in language so vague and undefined as to afford no fair warning of what
conduct might transgress them.").
12. See Michael G. Egger, Comment, Applying Estoppel Principles In Criminal
Law, 78 YALE L.J. 1046 (1969).
13. SeeUnited States v. Levin, 973 F.2d 463, 470 (6th Cir. 1992) (upholding
trial court's dismissal of the defendants' indictment based on the government's
inability to prove the required element of intent).
14. Compare, e.g., United States v. Brebner, 951 F.2d 1017, 1025 (9th Cir.
1991) (stating that the defense of criminal estoppel "focuses on the conduct of
the government officials rather than on a defendant's state of mind"), with, e.g.,
United States v. Austin, 915 F.2d 363, 365 (8th Cir. 1990) (finding that defendants
have the burden of proving that statements of government officials misled them
into believing their actions were lawful).
15. Compare, e.g., United States v. Evans, 712 F. Supp. 1435, 1442-44 (D.
Mont. 1989) (focusing on government representations, which were held not suffi-
cient to violate defendant's due process rights, in rejecting the estoppel defense),
with, e.g., United States v. Berg, 643 F. Supp. 1472, 1479-82 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (focus-
ing on defendants' actions, which were knowingly criminal despite vague govern-
ment direction, in rejecting the estoppel defense).
16. See, e.g., Brebner, 951 F.2d at 1024-27; Austin, 915 F.2d at 366-67; United
States v. Hedges, 912 F.2d 1397, 1405 (11th Cir. 1990); LAFAVE & SCOTr, supra
note 7, § 5.1 (e); 2 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 183 (a) (1984).
17. See, e.g., State v. McKown, 475 N.W.2d 63, 67 (Minn. 1991) (discussing
the contention that the child neglect statute failed to provide notice that the par-
ents might be criminally liable if their choice of medical treatment for their child
proved unsuccessful).
[Vol. 23
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ance of the defendant on statements or information provided by
government agents.'8 These objective and subjective bases are simi-
lar to the elements of "pure" entrapment.'9
III. COURTS' TREATMENT OF THE CRIMINAL ESTOPPEL DEFENSE
A. Supreme Court Interpretations
The United States Supreme Court first recognized criminal es-
toppel in 1959 in Raley v. Ohio.20 In a prosecution for contempt,
the Court held that erroneous advice given by the tribunal to the
defendants that they could assert their Fifth Amendment privilege
was a defense to the contempt charge. 2' The Court, in an opinion
by Justice Brennan, declared that the conviction of the defendants
for contempt as a result of their invoking the Fifth Amendment was
"the most indefensible sort of entrapment by the State - convicting
a citizen for exercising a privilege which the State clearly had told
him was available to him.,22
The Court based its application of the defense of criminal es-
toppel upon the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."1 In so holding, the Court stressed that while "there is no
suggestion that the Commission had any intent to deceive the ap-
pellants," there nevertheless was "active misleading" through the
Commission's erroneous advice that the Fifth Amendment privi-
lege was available even though the appellants had been immu-
18. See, e.g., United States v. Tallmadge, 829 F.2d 767, 774-75 (9th Cir. 1987)
(holding that the defendant could not be prosecuted for possession of a firearm
where he relied on the misleading statement of a government agent that he could
possess a nonconcealable weapon).
19. Entrapment applies where a defendant lacks the predisposition to
commit a crime and is induced by a government agent to participate in criminal
conduct. See Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 62-63 (1988). In Sorrells v.
United States, the Supreme Court outlined the contours of the entrapment de-
fense: the defendant had been affirmatively solicited by police to commit an act
known by all to constitute a crime, and the defendant lacked the predisposition to
commit it. 287 U.S. 435, 451 (1932).
Criminal estoppel is a distinct defense from entrapment with altogether dif-
ferent elements and rationale. Entrapment involves inducement - that is, a cer-
tain coercion that causes the defendant to commit a criminal act. See 2 RoBINSON,
supra note 16, §§ 183, 209. Criminal estoppel, on the other hand, involves mis-
taken reliance by the defendant that the act was permissible in certain circum-
stances. See id.
20. 360 U.S. 423 (1959).
21. Id. at 438-39.
22. Id. at 438.
23. Id. at 437.
5
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nized. 4
Six years later in Cox v. Louisiana," the Court again invoked
the criminal estoppel doctrine. The statute at issue in Cox prohib-
~ ,, 26ited demonstrations "near" a courthouse. The defendant, a
leader of a demonstration, had been advised by police to conduct
the demonstration on the far side of the street away from the
courthouse. 27 However, the defendant subsequently was arrested
28for demonstrating in that area. Justice Goldberg, speaking for the
majority, found that the defendant, in effect, had been advised that
"a demonstration at the place it was held would not be one 'near'
the courthouse within the terms of the statute."29 This official ad-
vice, like that given in Raley, was found to constitute "'an indefensi-
ble sort of entrapment by the State." 0
Following Raley, the Cox court based its application of the
criminal estoppel defense upon the Due Process Clause. 31 The "af-
firmative misleading" in Cox was the implied permission given to
the protesters "that they could meet where they did, 101 feet from
the courthouse steps, but could not meet closer to the court-
house."32 While not a clear statement, the court did find that it
provided sufficient basis for a criminal estoppel defense."
The Supreme Court last discussed criminal estoppel in United
States v. Pennsylvania Industrial Chemical Corp.34 This case dealt with
pollution charges brought under a statute that had been narrowly
construed by the Army Corps of Engineers in a manner that
tended to exonerate the defendant. 5 The defendant relied on the
Corps of Engineers' construction that the defendant's discharge
was not illegal under the statute36 and sought to offer evidence at
24. Id. at 438.
25. 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
26. Id. at 560.
27. Id. at 569-71.
28. Id. at 560.
29. Id. at 571.
30. Id. (quoting Raleyv. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 426 (1959)).
31. Cox, 379 U.S. at 571.
32. Id.
33. Id. ("The Due Process Clause does not permit convictions to be ob-
tained under such circumstances.").
34. 411 U.S. 655 (1973).
35. Id. at 674. Although the statute generally prohibited the dumping of
waste into navigable waters, the Army Corps of Engineers' regulations construed
an illegal discharge under the statute as one which obstructed navigation. Id. at
659.
36. Id. at 674.
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trial of his reliance on the interpretation of the statute. 7 The trial
court rejected the evidence as irrelevant.38 The Supreme Court
held that the evidence should have been allowed3 9 Citing two law
review articles on estoppel, the Supreme Court held:
[T]o the extent that the regulations deprived [the defen-
dant] of fair warning as to what conduct the Government
intended to make criminal, we think there can be no
doubt that traditional notions of fairness inherent in our
system of criminal justice prevent the Government from
proceeding with the prosecution.
As in Cox, the "affirmative misleading" in Pennsylvania Indus-
trial Chemical is also less than clear. While a regulation of the Army
Corps of Engineers did indicate that the appellant's conduct was
permissible, a separate controlling decision of the Court under-
mined that claim by authoritatively construing the statute as apply-
ing to all pollutants and not just to those that impeded navigation.4'
Following the Court's authority in that case, virtually all lower
courts subsequently held that the statute imposes a "flat ban" on
the discharge of pollutants. 42 The Supreme Court held that this
did not go to the question of whether reliance on the Army Corps
of Engineers' regulation was available as a defense, but rather, to
whether there was reliance and whether such reliance was reason-
able under the circumstances.43
Thus, from the Supreme Court decisions, the following con-
clusions may be drawn: (1) the defense of criminal estoppel is
based on the theory of due process and, in particular, on the issue_ • 4 4
of what constitutes a fair warning that conduct is criminal; (2) the
37. Id. at 673.
38. Id. at 660.
39. Id. at 675.
40. Pennsylvania Indus. Chem. Corp.. 411 U.S. at 674.
41. SeeUnited States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224 (1966). This decision
came down four years before the alleged criminal conduct in Pennsylvania Indus-
trial Chemical Corp.
42. See Pennsylvania Indus. Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. at 671 (citing United States
v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 375 F.2d 621 (3d Cir. 1967); United States v. Consolida-
tion Coal Co., 354 F. Supp. 173 (N.D. W. Va. 1973); United States v. Granite State
Packing Co., 343 F. Supp. 57 (D.N.H. 1972), affd, 470 F.2d 303 (1st Cir. 1972);
United States v. Genoa Coop. Creamery Co., 336 F. Supp. 539 (W.D. Wis. 1972);
United States v. Maplewood Poultry Co., 327 F. Supp. 686 (D. Me. 1971); United
States v. United States Steel Corp., 328 F. Supp. 354 (N.D. Ind. 1970); United
States v. Interlake Steel Corp., 297 F. Supp. 912 (N.D. Ill. 1969)).
43. Id. at 675.
44. See id. at 670-75; Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 571-72 (1966); Raley v.
7
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pertinent government pronouncements, or "affirmative mislead-
ings," that are alleged tojustify the defense may be "implied" from
behavior and from circumstances; 45 (3) the defense may be raised
even though the pertinent pronouncement is contradicted by
other more authoritative statements;6 and (4) whether the defense
may be successful in any given case should be determined by the
finder of fact.
47
B. Circuit Court Interpretations
With the foundation laid by the Supreme Court, the federal
circuits have developed more distinct and workable approaches to
criminal estoppel. As in the Supreme Court decisions, due process
has played a primary role in the lower court applications of crimi-
nal estoppel. 48 These courts have emphasized the unfairness of al-
lowing prosecutions to go forward when a defendant has been led
by government statements or conduct to believe reasonably that
the actions which would later form the basis of the criminal charge
were, in fact, authorized.49
The most expansive use of criminal estoppel has been from
the Ninth Circuit, where the defense has been based on statements
made by nongovernment agents. In United States v. Talimadge, the
court based criminal estoppel on statements made by a privately li-
censed firearms dealer that led the defendant into believing that
he lawfully could possess a firearm. 50 The Ninth Circuit, in United
States v. Clegg, also held that a defendant's reliance on statements of
government officials, who led the defendant to believe he was
transporting guns lawfully, was a defense to his prosecution for ex-
porting firearms.51 Other Ninth Circuit cases have held that crimi-
Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 437-42 (1959).
45. See Cox, 379 U.S. at 571; Raey, 360 U.S. at 437-39.
46. See Pennsylvania Indus. Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. at 671-75.
47. See id. at 675.
48. See, e.g., United States v. Abcasis, 45 F.3d 39, 45 (2d Cir. 1995) (explain-
ing the due process element that helps form the foundation for entrapment by
estoppel); United States v. Levin, 973 F.2d 463, 470 (6th Cir. 1992) (emphasizing
due process infringements in affirming lower court's acceptance of the criminal
estoppel defense); United States v. Tallmadge, 829 F.2d 767, 770-75 (9th Cir.
1987) (analyzing due process exhaustively and stating that the government
agent's misleading comments caused the prosecution and conviction to violate
due process).
49. See cases cited supra note 48.
50. Tallmadge, 829 F.2d at 775. For further treatment of Tallmadge in the
context of actual versus apparent authority, see discussion infra Part V.D. 1.
51. 846 F.2d 1221, 1224 (9th Cir. 1988). For further treatment of Clegg in
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nal estoppel "applies when an official tells the defendant that cer-
tain conduct is legal and the defendant believes the official" 52 and
shows reasonable reliance on the misinformation. However, the
Ninth Circuit's broad expansion of criminal estoppel occasionally
has been overturned. 4
The Sixth Circuit, in United States v. Levin, created a four-part
test to delineate the elements of estoppel.55 The case involved a
prosecution for Medicare fraud and false statements, based upon a
physician billing a flat rate for a medical product but receiving cer-
tain disposable surgical supplies or a credit of equivalent value for
every medical product purchased . The government's theory was
that fraud occurred when the government was induced to pay for
the ostensible full price of the product without any reduction for
the value of the rebated surgical supplies or credit.-7 It turned out,
however, that the Health Care Financing Administration, a gov-
ernment agency, had issued letter opinions to others in the indus-
try approving of this sales arrangement.5 Although the defendants
the context of actual versus apparent authority, see discussion infra Part V.D.2.
52. See United States v. Hsieh Hui Mei Chen, 754 F.2d 817, 825 (9th Cir.
1985).
53. See United States v. Timmins, 464 F.2d 385, 387 (9th Cir. 1972) (finding
that the would-be conscientious objector reasonably could rely on the draft
board's incorrect position that formal religious training was necessary for consci-
entious objector status).
54. See United States v. Albertini, 830 F.2d 985, 990 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding
that a protester's conduct of distributing leaflets on a naval base could legally be
resumed in reliance upon the appellate court's reversal of his conviction), rev'd,
472 U.S. 675, 683 (1985) (dismissing as implausible the assertion that the defen-
dant lacked notice that entry on the base was prohibited).
In addition, some of the Ninth Circuit's pronouncements on civil estoppel
against the government also have been overturned. See United States Immigra-
tion & Naturalization Serv. v. Miranda, 459 U.S. 14, 18 (1982) (finding that de-
spite a delay in processing, the government was not estopped from enforcing Im-
migration and Naturalization Service regulations); United States Immigration &
Naturalization Serv. v. Hibi, 414 U.S. 5, 8-9 (1973) (holding that neither the fail-
ure to fully publicize the rights that Congress accorded to those deserving natu-
ralization, nor the failure to station an authorized representative in the Philip-
pines to assist those seeking naturalization, estopped the government from relying
on the statutory deadline).
55. 973 F.2d 463, 468 (6th Cir. 1992). The Sixth Circuit has broken the de-
fense down into the following elements: (1) a government official must have ad-
vised that the act was legal; (2) the defendant must rely on the advice; (3) the re-
liance must be reasonable; and (4) given this reliance, the continuation of the
prosecution must be unfair. See id. The First Circuit has adopted the same test.
See United States v. Smith, 940 F.2d 710, 714 (1st Cir. 1991).
56. Levin, 973 F.2d at 464-65.
57. Id. at 464.
58. Id. at 465.
9
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themselves initiated no inquiry concerning the legality of the sales
campaign, the court noted that the government's approval had
been disseminated throughout the medical community. 59 The
Sixth Circuit specifically found that: (1) the government had ap-
proved the sales promotion program, (2) the defendants had re-
lied upon this pronouncement, (3) the defendants' reliance was
reasonable, and (4) prosecution would be unfair under the cir-
cumstances.6°
The Second Circuit focuses on government conduct which the
defendant reasonably believed authorized her to commit an unau-•61
thorized act. In United States v. Abcasis, the defendants maintained
that they had been authorized by the government to deal in narcot-
ics in conjunction with their role as confidential informants. 62 At
trial, the court instructed the jury that it would be a defense if they
were, in fact, authorized to so act, but it refused to instruct the jury
that it would be a defense if their belief was mistaken, inasmuch as
the offense was not a specific intent crime.63 The Second Circuit
reversed, holding that the defense of criminal estoppel applies
when a defendant "commits forbidden acts in the mistaken but
reasonable good [-] faith belief that he has in fact been authorized
to do so."64 The court ruled that the defense "focuses on the con-
duct of the government leading the defendant to believe reasonably
that he was authorized to do the act forbidden by law. The doc-
trine depends on the unfairness of prosecuting one who has been
led by the conduct of government agents to believe his acts were
authorized. ,
65
The court noted that the defendants should be allowed to
produce evidence that the government agents made statements or
committed acts that caused the defendants to believe they were
authorized. 66 The admission of such statements and acts demon-
strates that estoppel does not depend solely on specific advice but
on all of the circumstances, including conduct, that form the basis
59. Id.
60. Id. at 468.
61. See United States v. Abcasis, 45 F.3d 39, 44-45 (2d Cir. 1995) (applying
criminal estoppel where the defendant reasonably relied on a drug enforcement
agent's statements that he was authorized to commit unlawful acts).
62. Id. at 42.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 43.
65. Id. at 44 (citing United States v. Brebner, 951 F.2d 1017, 1025 (9th Cir.
1991); United States v. Smith, 940 F.2d 710, 714 (1st Cir. 1991)).
66. Id. at 45.
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for the belief of the defendants.
67
The Eleventh Circuit has stressed objective fairness rather than
whether the defendant actually believed the government advice. In
United States v. Hedges, the court emphasized reliance on an infor-
mal communication with a government employee. 68 The court de-
scribed the defense as resting "upon principles of fairness rather
than the defendant's mental state and thus it may be raised even in
strict liability offense cases."69 The application of fairness principles
is a broader view of the estoppel defense and is not uniformly fol-
lowed.
The Fifth Circuit has held that criminal estoppel only applies
to federal government officials or their authorized agents. In
United States v. Spires, a convicted felon on probation attempted to
invoke the defense when charged with possession of a firearm.7 °
The defendant grounded his reliance on statements by a state
crime task force agent that he could not carry a gun but that he
71
should leave the gun in his truck and put it away when at home.
The court refused to instruct the jury on the basis that the defen-
dant's reliance was not based on advice by a government official,72
holding that the state task force agent on whom the defendant re-
lied had no authority to render the advice, didn't consider herself
a government agent, and never held a federal commission. 73 The
court held that the state task force and its agents were state actors -
- but not authorized federal agents - notwithstanding the fact they
received federal funding. 4 Therefore, without reliance on the fed-
eral official, the court held that estoppel did not apply.
75
The Eighth Circuit has agreed with the Ninth Circuit's state-
ment of the defense but has been much more conservative in its
application. In United States v. Austin, 76 a convicted felon raised the
estoppel defense when prosecuted for crimes stemming from a ri-
fle purchase. The defendant claimed that several police officers
and the gun dealer who sold him the rifle told him that it was not
67. Abcasis, 45 F.3d at 42-43 (citing Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965)).
68. 912 F.2d 1397, 1404 (11th Cir. 1990).
69. Id. at 1405 (citing United States v. Tallmadge, 829 F.2d 767, 773 (9th
Cir. 1987)).
70. 79 F.3d 464, 465 (5th Cir. 1996).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 466.
73. Id. at 467.
74. Id. at 466-67.
75. Id. at 467.
76. 915 F.2d 363 (8th Cir. 1990).
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illegal for a felon to possess a rifle." However, he also denied he
was a felon on a federal firearms questionnaire. 8 The court never
speculated as to whether the defendant in fact received the advice
he claimed, but rather succinctly declared that the individuals of-
fering advice were merely private individuals without any apparent
or actual authority to bind the government.' 9 Thus, the court con-
cluded that it is the authority of the government official that is cru-
cial to the criminal estoppel defense. °
The circuit courts have not strayed far from the Supreme
Court's foundation when addressing the criminal estoppel defense.
Yet, each circuit has crafted its own emphasis in analyzing the ap-
plication of the criminal estoppel defense. In short, it is important
for a defense attorney to know the rules of the circuit, especially
with respect to its disposition toward actual authority, subjective
fairness, government conduct, and the defendant's reasonable be-
lief.
C. Minnesota Tackles Criminal Estoppel
In State v. McKown, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the
dismissal of second-degree manslaughter charges against parents
who relied upon spiritual treatment in lieu of conventional medi-
cine in caring for their son, who ultimately died of diabetes melli-
tus.81 In its decision, the court focused on a provision in the Min-
nesota child neglect statute, which states that parents and
guardians must provide their children with food, clothing, shelter,
health care, and supervision."' The court noted that if the parent
relies in good faith on spiritual means or prayer for care of the
child, as an alternative to conventional medical treatment, this
treatment cannot be the basis for prosecution under the child ne-
83glect statute. The court found that this statute was not "in pai ma-teria"84 with the second-degree manslaughter statute,85 and it con-
77. Id. at 365.
78. Id. at 364.
79. Id. at 366-67. The court rejected the contention that a federal license to
sell firearms is sufficient to transform sellers into government officials for pur-
poses of the criminal estoppel defense. Id.
80. Id. at 366 (citing United States v. Tallmadge, 829 F.2d 767, 777 (9th Cir.
1987)).
81. 475 N.W.2d 63, 64 (Minn. 1991).
82. Id. at 67 (citing MINN. STAT. § 609.378(a) (1988)).
83. Id. at 68-69.
84. Statutes in pari materia are those relating to the same purpose or thing or
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cluded that the proviso of the child neglect statute allowing parents
to "select and depend upon" spiritual treatment 8 failed to give fair
notice that acting in accordance with the statute could expose the
parents to criminal prosecution. The court also held that the
statute would "violate the long-established rule that a government
may not officially inform an individual that certain conduct is per-
mitted and then prosecute the individual for engaging in that same
conduct., 8 The court ruled that, having granted parents the right
to rely upon methods such as Christian Science treatment, the state
may not prosecute parents for exercising that very right and be
consistent with due process of law. 9
IV. APPLICATION OF CRIMINAL ESTOPPEL IN CASES OF
KNOWING ACQUIESCENCE
A. Wen Is Government Knowledge Enough?
As noted above, the case law requires a defendant asserting
criminal estoppel to rely upon a representation from a government
official. Yet, in a number of cases in which criminal estoppel was
asserted successfully, no affirmative representations were made. 90 A
difficult issue, and one which is fact-dependent, is when govern-
ment conduct or knowing acquiescence will justify submission of
the defense to the finder of fact in the absence of affirmative repre-
sentations.
The courts have tried to make distinctions as to what level of
government knowledge is enough. Prior to its three seminal cases
in this area, the Supreme Court was reluctant to apply "immunity"
to prosecutions based on the hint of government knowledge.9 1
having a common purpose. See id. at 65.
85. Id. at 67.
86. MINN. STAT. § 609.378.
87. McKown, 475 N.W.2d at 67-69.
88. Id. at 68.
89. Id.
90. See, e.g., United States v. Race, 632 F.2d 1114, 1120 (4th Cir. 1980) (find-
ing the government's continued performance of the contract with knowledge of
certain facts estopped the government from prosecuting based on those facts).
91. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). The
Court held that "[t]hough employees of the government may have known of
those programs [which allegedly constituted violations of the Sherman Act] and
winked at them or tacitly approved them, no immunity would have thereby been
obtained." Id. at 226. Instrumental to the Court's decision was the fact that Con-
gress had established a method for obtaining approval of buying programs with
respect to which the defendants did not avail themselves. See id. at 226-27.
13
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Likewise, the Supreme Court did not delve deeply into issues of
acquiescence when it examined criminal estoppel directly. At the
circuit level, knowing acquiescence by the government has figured
prominently in defense strategies.9 In particular, the Ninth Circuit
has concluded that solicitation, encouragement, and assistance
from government agents constitutes knowing acquiescence and is a
defense.93 However, in a claim of what could be termed "reverse
reliance," the Ninth Circuit has held that the required "affirmative
misleading" conduct is not present where a defendant misrepre-
sents facts to a government agent who acts upon those misrepre-• 94
sentations. In asserting the defense of criminal estoppel, there-
fore, affirmative representations are not required, so long as the
government has engaged in conduct which has created the same
effect of misleading a person into believing the conduct is author-
ized.95
Whether Socony is still good law is questionable, as it was not cited in any of the
three Supreme Court cases dealing with the defense of criminal estoppel dis-
cussed herein. However, it was referred to in a dissenting opinion in Cox v. Lou-
isiana. See 379 U.S. 559, 582 n.5 (Black, J., dissenting).
Indeed, the case can be made that there was no affirmative approval in Cox
of the demonstrators' behavior but only a partially successful effort to keep them
as far from the courthouse as possible. See id. at 586-88 (Clark, J., dissenting).
Similarly, one of the defendants in Raley was allowed to infer from the circum-
stances of his colleagues that he could appropriately assert the Fifth Amendment
privilege. See Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 430, 437 (1959).
92. See, e.g., United States v. Abcasis, 45 F.3d 39, 43-44 (2d Cir. 1995) (find-
ing that consistency of government agents' actions supported defendants' infer-
ence that they were still immune from prosecution as federal informants); United
States v. Levin, 973 F.2d 463, 469 (6th Cir. 1991) (affirming the trial court's find-
ing that the government's issuance of "numerous opinion letters... appear[ed]
to sanction the practice challenged by this indictment"); United States v. Hedges,
912 F.2d 1397, 1401 (11th Cir. 1990) (discussing the knowledge of a superior who
was aware of the defendants' activities, which would be criminal, and pointing to
the statutory requirement that the government official have knowledge of the
criminal behavior).
93. SeeUnited States v. Clegg, 846 F.2d 1221, 1222-24 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing
United States v. Tallmadge, 829 F.2d 767, 774 (9th Cir. 1987)). The dissenting
opinion in Clegg argued that since the record failed to disclose reliance on any
official interpretation of law, the defense did not apply. See id. at 1225 (Skopil, J.,
dissenting).
94. See United States v. Brebner, 951 F.2d 1017, 1025-26 (9th Cir. 1991).
Moreover, approval by state and local law enforcement officials would not be suf-
ficient to justify the defense because those officials "lacked the authority to bind
the federal government to an erroneous interpretation of federal law." See id. at
1026.
95. See, e.g., Race, 632 F.2d at 1119; State v. McKown, 475 N.W.2d 63, 68-69
(Minn. 1991).
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There are certain situations which do not create the requisite
knowing acquiescence. Mere nonprosecution of a certain type of
conduct is insufficient to support a criminal estoppel defense.96
For example, the claim of an automobile driver that everyone al-
ways drives ten miles over the speed limit on a particular roadway
would not likely succeed as a defense to a speeding ticket. The
road is marked, there is no misleading information about the
speed limit, and it is obvious to all that only a small number of
speeders are ever ticketed. Any government "acquiescence" here is
nothing more than a reflection on law enforcement priorities.
97
In addition to nonenforcement, obsolescence of a statute is in-
sufficient to form the basis of knowing acquiescence. The obsoles-
cence of a statute, referred to as desuetude,9 applies when a law
simply is not prosecuted at all even though it is "on the books."99
Although commentators have argued that desuetude should create
a sort of estoppel defense, 100 case law is largely to the contrary.
101
96. See, e.g., United States v. Conley, 859 F. Supp. 909, 935-36 (W.D. Pa.
1994) (holding that lax enforcement against illegal video poker machines does
not make them de facto legal or otherwise invalidate a valid prohibition).
97. While law enforcement agents may choose any case to prosecute, they
may not do so on the basis of impermissible factors (such as race, gender, et cet-
era) without violating equal protection and running afoul of the selective prose-
cution defense. That defense is beyond the scope of this Article. For an example
of a selective prosecution case, see Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985).
98. See BLACK'S LAwDIcrIoNARY449 (6th ed. 1990).
99. See id. The nonenforcement of fornication statutes is an example of
desuetude. Such laws are on the books in Minnesota and about half of all states,
but prosecutions are so rare as to be front-page news when they occur. See
RiCHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 260-61 n.44, 309 (1992) (referring to a hand-
ful of news stories describing such prosecutions or attempts to repeal the stat-
utes). The Nonfelony Enforcement Advisory Committee recommended repeal of
Minnesota's fornication statute. See Nonfelony Enforcement Advisory Committee,
Final Report 103-05 (Jan. 15, 1997) (on file with author).
100. See Egger, supra note 12, at 1071 (citing Arthur E. Bonfield, The Abroga-
tion Of Penal Statutes By Non-Enforcement, 49 IOWA L. REv. 389, 393 (1964)).
101. See, e.g., San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm. v. Eu, 826
F.2d 814, 822 n.15 (9th Cir. 1987) (discussing the Supreme Court's treatment of
desuetude and stating that "federal courts should not lightly determine that as
statute has fallen into desuetude"); Delaware Watermen's Ass'n v. State, No. 789,
1983 WL 103281, at *5-*6 (Del. Ch. Apr. 5, 1983) (discussing the theory and fac-
tors of the "desuetude" argument); Doris v. Police Comm'r, 373 N.E.2d 944, 949
(Mass. 1978) (stating that it would be "a most serious consequence if we were to
conclude that the inattention or inactivity of governmental officials could render
a statute unenforceable and thus deprive the public of the benefits or protections
bestowed by the Legislature"); Committee on Legal Ethics of the W. Va. State Bar
v. Printz, 416 S.E.2d 720, 724-27 (W. Va. 1992) (discussing the doctrine of desue-
tude).
15
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Mere silence by the government does not give rise to an estoppel
defense. ' °0 Alternatively, being lulled into the reasonable impres-
sion that conduct is not criminal may justify dismissal in unique
circumstances. 
03
B. United States v. Najarian: An Example of Knowing Acquiescence
United States v. Najarian, a 1996 Food and Drug Administra-
tion (FDA) prosecution in Minnesota, illustrates the application of
criminal estoppel in a situation involving official acquiescence. An
analysis of the facts in Najarian highlights the subjective nature of
criminal estoppel, as opposing parties view the case quite differ-
ently. On the one hand is a defendant who carried on an activity,
purportedly with the belief that his practices were officially ap-
proved due to the regulatory agency's silence. On the other hand
is a regulatory agency, purportedly believing that its act of silence
did not constitute approval and that the defendant willfully ig-
nored any indications that his practices were subject to prosecu-
tion.
1. The Facts
John S. Najarian, M.D., a well-known transplant surgeon and
chair of the department of surgery at the University of Minnesota,
developed a drug that effectively induced immunosuppression and
treated graft rejection in organ transplant recipients. 10 5 On De-
cember 9, 1970, Dr. Najarian and others at the University of Min-
nesota filed an Investigational New Drug (IND) Application with
the FDA for the use of this new drug called Antilymphocyte Globu-
lin (ALG).' 6 For the next twenty-two years, ALG underwent re-
102. See United States v. Mann, 517 F.2d 259, 270 (5th Cir. 1975) (rejecting
an estoppel defense in the case of a willful misapplication of bank funds, because
governmental silence and the absence of prior prosecutions does not constitute
"active misleading"); United States v. Brookshire, 514 F.2d 786, 789 (10th Cir.
1975) (stating custom and usage involving an act that a state had defined as
criminal does not defeat prosecution of a defendant for violation of that statute).
103. See United States v. Insco, 496 F.2d 204, 208-09 (5th Cir. 1974). In In-
sco, the Fifth Circuit reversed the conviction of a defendant who violated a state
statute by failing to place an attribution clause on a political bumper sticker. The
court based its decision on the fact that this was the first prosecution ever brought
under the statute, and on the "universal practice" of non-enforcement. Id.
104. 915 F. Supp. 1460 (D. Minn. 1996).
105. Id. at 1463.
106. See Notice of Claimed Investigational Exemption for a New Drug Ap-
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search and was used extensively at many transplant centers.10 7 Al-
though ALG remained on investigational status with the FDA dur-
ing its entire twenty-two-year life,'0 8 by the late 1980s the University
of Minnesota's annual production of ALG exceeded 40,000
grams.'0 ALG was distributed to more than 100 transplant centers
in the United States and Europe." 0 ALG received widespread use
despite its lack of official approval."' A monetary charge sufficient
to enable the University to recoup its costs was levied on the drug
from the very beginning."2
In 1992, however, the Upjohn Company complained to the
FDA that Najarian was selling ALG unfairly." 3 By mid-August 1992,
FDA representatives visited the University and placed the ALG pro-
gram on hold."
4
2. The Court's Procedure
Following a lengthy investigation by the FDA,"1 Najarian was
indicted in United States District Court in St. Paul, Minnesota, on a
variety of charges alleging violations of the Food, Drug & Cosmetic
Act and the Public Health Service Act."6 The major count of the
indictment alleged a conspiracy to violate these laws by illegally dis-
tributing and charging for ALG,"
7 among other matters."
8
plication submitted by Department of Surgery, University of Minnesota 34-37
(Dec. 9, 1970) [hereinafter IND Application] (on file with author).
107. John W. Lundquist, United States v.- Najarian: A Postmortem on Regula-
tory Misdirection, 131 ARCHIVES SURGERY 911, 911 (1996).
108. See Najarian, 915 F. Supp. at 1464 (describing Najarian's duty to report
to the FDA from the program's inception in 1971 until its end in 1992).
109. See Lundquist, supra note 107, at 911.
110. See David Peterson & Mary Jane Smetanka, 'U' Prepares to Fight Feds Over
ALG Money, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Dec. 17, 1996, at IA. ALG reportedly was
distributed to as many as half of all transplant centers in the United States. See
Ellen Hale, Exonerated Surgeon Warns Transplant Drug Lost to Patients Forever,
GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, Mar. 10, 1996, available at 1996 WL 4375774.
111. See Tony Brown, A Transplant Drug Case Taints the Mighty, NAT'L L.J.,
Apr. 1, 1996, atA12.
112. See Najarian, 915 F. Supp. at 1465 n.6. The author refers to this mone-
tary charge as "cost recovery."
113. See Hale, supra note 110.
114. SeeNajarian, 915 F. Supp. at 1467.
115. See Lundquist, supra note 107, at 911. The FDA investigated Najarian
and the ALG program for nearly two and one-half years. During this time, Na-
jarian and the program also were investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion, the Internal Revenue Service, attorneys representing the University of Min-
nesota, and the U.S. Attorney for the District of Minnesota. See id.
116. SeeNajarian, 915 F. Supp. at 1463.
117. See id.
17
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The defense sought pretrial dismissal of the FDA charges on
the ground that the government knew about the manner in which
ALG had been distributed 9 and should, accordingly, "be estopped
from prosecuting the defendant for alleged conduct that the FDA
had countenanced over the course of years." 2  The court denied
the motion on the basis that the defense was so fact-dependent that
the jury must decide it."12
The evidence at trial established that cost recovery had been
requested in the original IND application122 and had been implic-
itly granted by the FDA's failure to object. 2 3 FDA regulations pro-
vided that IND approval became effective thirty days after filing,
absent negative comments from the FDA, including applications
seeking cost recovery. 24 The practice of permitting cost recovery
was pursuant to informal policy, which was confirmed in a 1973
opinion from FDA's general counsel. 2 5  No written regulations
specifically dealing with the criteria and mechanism for cost recov-
ery were promulgated until 1987.126 The evidence established that
the FDA not only failed to object to the cost recovery request in-
cluded in the IND application,127 but that it had been aware for
years that the University was charging clinical investigators for ALG
and did not object. The FDA formally granted approval for cost
recovery in 1989 after regulations had been promulgated on the
subject.
129
118. Najarian also was charged with theft and embezzlement, mail fraud, tax
fraud, and obstructing justice. See id. The jury returned a verdict of not guilty on
these non-FDA charges. Transcript of Proceedings, Feb. 21, 1996, at 1, United
States v. Najarian, 915 F. Supp. 1460 (D. Minn. 1996) (No. 3-95-45) (on file with
author).
119. See Najarian, 915 F. Supp. at 1463.
120. Id. at 1473.
121. Id. (citing United States v. French, 46 F.3d 710, 714 n.6 (8th Cir.
1995)).
122. Id.; see also IND Application, supra note 106, at 34-37.
123. Najarian, 915 F. Supp. at 1473.
124. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.40(b) (1) (1987); see also I JAMES T. O'RELLY, FOOD
AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION § 13.12, at 13-76 to -77 (2d ed. 1995) (noting that if the
application is not acted upon in 30 days, either by approval or disapproval, then
the IND is deemed accepted).
125. See Op. FDA Gen. Counsel (Sept. 17, 1973) (on file with author).
126. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.7(d) (1987). The current rule explicitly calls for
prior written approval from the FDA before changes for an IND are authorized.
See id. (1996).
127. See Lundquist, supra note 107, at 913-14.
128. See id.
129. See id.
[Vol. 23
18
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 4 [1997], Art. 1
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol23/iss4/1
1997] EVOLUTION OF THE CRIMINAL ESTOPPEL DEFENSE 861
Although the trial court had denied the pretrial motion to
dismiss, 130 it did grant the defendant's motion for a judgment of
acquittal at the close of the government's case-in-chief. 1 3 ' The
court ruled that the government had failed to establish sufficient
evidence to justify submission of any of the FDA counts to the
jury.
3 2
At the conclusion of the case, the court stated that the FDA
monitored the ALG Program "for 15 or 20 years with what I guess I
could describe as benign neglect."33 Referring to the issue raised
before trial, the court added, "The FDA, as I indicated, was cer-
tainly aware of what was going on, and yet they came in here.., to
testify that somehow they were hoodwinked by this defendant and
his colleagues and other people at the University.",
34
3. Analysis ofNajarian
Because the burden of disapproving IND applications is on the
FDA, 35 knowing acquiescence by the government should justify
proceeding with plans set forth in the IND application 3 6 which, in
the case of ALG, included a proposal for cost-recovery sales. 1 7 In
Najarian, the evidence of official acquiescence was found not in the
FDA's acts but in its omissions. While silence generally cannot be
construed as approval, 13 when an affirmative obligation to respond
139exists, official acquiescence is tantamount to approval . Such a re-
sult is, of course, fact-specific but is not without support from well-
established legal principles.
130. United States v. Najarian, 915 F. Supp. 1460, 1473 (D. Minn. 1996).
131. See Transcript of Proceedings, Feb. 13, 1996, at 12, United States v. Na-
jarian, 915 F. Supp. 1460 (D. Minn. 1996) (No. 3-95-45) (on file with author).
132. See id. at 6-7, 9, 11.
133. Transcript of Proceedings, Feb. 21, 1996, at 2, United States v. Na-
jarian, 915 F. Supp. 1460 (D. Minn. 1996) (No. 3-95-45) (on file with author).
134. Id. at 3.
135. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.40(b)(1) (1996); 1 O'REILLY, supra note 124, §
13.12, at 13-76.
136. See 1 O'REILLY, supra note 124, § 13.12, at 13-77.
137. See IND Application, supra note 106, at 34-37.
138. See 2 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RIcHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF
CoNTRAcTs § 6.49, at 561 (4th ed. 1991) [hereinafter WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS].
139. See id. § 6:52.
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a. An Analogy from Contract Law
The distinction is well-illustrated by examples drawn from the
realm of contract law where the general rule is that silence may not
be construed as acceptance of an offer.'40 An exception to the rule
exists for parties that have an ongoing relationship that justifies the
offeror in regarding silence as acceptance. 4 1 Thus, if the parties
stand in a vendor-vendee relationship pursuant to which orders are
accepted and payment is made on an ongoing basis, silence in re-
142sponse to an offer may well constitute acceptance. The offeree
may authorize the offeror to regard silence as acceptance, or other
reasons may exist such that a reasonable person would construe si-
lence as indicating assent. 143 In circumstances where it is apparent
that silence will be regarded as acceptance, an individual "should
not be allowed to deny the natural interpretation of his conduct."
'
b. Applying the Analogy to Criminal Estoppel in Najarian
Applying the same principle of contract law to criminal estop-
pel, when an affirmative duty to respond is imposed on the gov-
ernment, knowing acquiescence in conduct should be on the same
footing as express approval. Therefore, knowing acquiescence,
coupled with a duty to object, is the functional equivalent of official
advice for purposes of applying the elements of estoppel.
In the case of FDA receipt of the IND application in Najarian,
approval could be inferred from FDA silence as a matter of law and
practice. 145 Under both contract and regulatory law, parties dealing
with the FDA are justified in relying upon official acquiescence just
as though formal, written approval had been expressed.'4 Na-
jarian, through the IND application, established both the due pro-
cess and reliance components of the defense of criminal estoppel.
By virtue of the government's duty to voice any objections it has to
the conduct proposed in the application, Najarian received notice
140. See id. § 6:49.
141. Seeid. § 6:52.
142. See id. § 6:49, at 569.
143. See id. § 6:52.
144. 2 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, supra note 138, § 6:52, at 611.
145. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.40(b)(1) (1996); 1 O'REILLY, supra note 124, §
13.12, at 13-76 to -77.
146. Compare 2 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, supra note 138, § 6:52, with 1
O'REILLY, supra note 124, § 13.12 at 13-76 to 13-77.
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that he would not be subject to criminal prosecution for engagingin te poposd " 147
in the proposed plan, thereby defeating the government's claim
that he received the minimum due process required.'14 Likewise,
the subjective reliance aspects of the estoppel defense were met,
because Najarian was entitled to rely upon official acquiescence in
the application.
A looming question remains: If criminal estoppel may be as-
serted against the government based on its knowing acquiescence
with respect to the relevant conduct, how is the government's
knowledge to be proven? In the absence of an admission, the de-
fense may resort to the concept of "willful blindness."
C. Asserting the Doctrine of Willful Blindness
A jury instruction given with increasing frequency concerns
the notion of willful blindness. 4 9 The instruction allows the jury to
impute to an individual knowledge that should be obvious to him
when accompanied by "a conscious purpose to avoid enlighten-
ment.'. 5° One leading jury instruction guide contains the following
model instruction on willful blindness:
The government may prove that the defendant acted
"knowingly" by proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
this defendant deliberately closed [his] [her] eyes to what
would otherwise have been obvious to [him] [her]. No
one can avoid responsibility for a crime by deliberately
ignoring what is obvious. A finding beyond reasonable
doubt of an intent of the defendant to avoid knowledge
or enlightenment would permit the jury to infer knowl-
edge. Stated another way, a defendant's knowledge of a
147. See I O'REILLY, supra note 124, § 13.12, at 13-76 to -77.
148. See State v. McKown, 475 N.W.2d 63, 67 (Minn. 1991) (citing Kolender v.
Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983), for the proposition that "due process requires
criminal statutes to define offenses clearly enough that ordinary people can de-
termine what they prohibit").
149. See United States v. Abbas, 74 F.3d 506, 513 (4th Cir. 1996) (ruling that
willful blindness instruction given in drug conspiracy case was proper); United
States v. Gabriele, 63 F.3d 61, 66 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that a willful blindness
instruction in Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act prosecution
was warranted); United States v. Brandon, 17 F.3d 409, 451-52 (1st Cir. 1994)
(permitting a willful blindness instruction in a fraud case).
150. United States v. Zimmerman, 832 F.2d 454, 458 (8th Cir. 1987); see also
United States v. Hiland, 909 F.2d 1114, 1130 (8th Cir. 1990) (finding that a jury
instruction for willful blindness need not state that one defendant acted with will-
ful intent to do the illegal act, but that negligent conduct may impute knowl-
edge).
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particular fact may be inferred from a deliberate or inten-
tional ignorance or deliberate or intentional blindness to
the existence of that fact.
It is, of course, entirely up to you as to whether you
find any deliberate ignorance or deliberate closing of the
eyes and the inferences to be drawn from any such evi-
dence.
You may not infer that a defendant had knowledge,
however, from proof of a mistake, negligence, careless-
ness, or a belief in an inaccurate proposition.
5
1
A court may give a willful blindness instruction when an indi-
vidual claims a lack of knowledge and there are facts which would
support an inference of deliberate ignorance on his part.' But
since the purpose of the instruction is to allow the jury to impute
knowledge of what should be obvious when there is a conscious
purpose to avoid enlightenment, 15 3 there is no reason to limit its
application to defendants. When criminal estoppel is asserted by
the defense, knowledge on the part of the government of the op-
erative facts becomes the critical issue. 54 Fairness and consistency
require that the doctrine of willful blindness be as accessible to the
defendants as it has been to the government.
In United States v. Hiland, an Eighth Circuit case, the court gave
a willful blindness instruction to establish knowledge on the part of
the defendants that a drug was dangerous and falsely labeled.
15
The court found that if the defendants did not have actual knowl-
edge of that fact, the jury could infer knowledge from evidence
that the defendants had failed to investigate reports of adverse re-
actions. 56 The court went so far as to conclude that, even though
151. EDWARD J. DEvITr ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRAMCE AND INSTRUCrIONS:
CIvIL AND CRIMINAL§ 17.09 (4th ed. 1992).
152. See, e.g., United States v. White, 794 F.2d 367, 371 (8th Cir. 1986);
United States v. McAllister, 747 F.2d 1273, 1275 (9th Cir. 1984). The instruction
has its modem genesis in the Ninth Circuit decision of United States v. Jewell, 532
F.2d 697, 700-04 (9th Cir. 1976). The court in that case allowed a willful blind-
ness jury instruction where a defendant may have "knowingly" possessed mari-
juana, based on the facts that he was offered $100 to transport a car from Mexico
to the United States and the car was laden with 110 pounds of marijuana. Id.
153. See Hiland, 909 F.2d at 1130; Zimmerman, 832 F.2d at 458.
154. See United States v. Race, 632 F.2d 1114, 1121 (4th Cir. 1980) (finding
that even though the defendants may not have performed properly under the
contract, the Navy had forfeited its right to complain, since it knew of the defen-
dants' interpretation of the contract and did not advise them of its objections).
155. Hiland, 909 F.2d at 1130.
156. Id. at 1130-31.
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the defendants were under no legal duty to inquire of the FDA as
to whether it was necessary to test the drug for safety, "their deci-
sion not to consult the FDA constituted at least some evidence of
deliberate ignorance.9
157
Although willful blindness instructions usually are applied
against defendants, they could be used against the government as
well. In cases where the government is on notice that regulated
persons are relying upon official acquiescence in directing the
conduct, but the government fails to investigate or inquire into the
nature of the defendant's conduct, a willful blindness instruction
may be appropriate to establish the government's knowledge of the
essential facts justifying estoppel. In United States v. Najarian, for
example, it appeared that FDA staff for years turned a blind eye
toward alleged regulatory failings, including cost recovery, due to
the medical importance of the drug.15 At trial, the government
denied knowledge of and acquiescence in the cost recovery pro-
gram, yet it asserted that the inspection reports which were pre-
pared by the early staff personnel who were aware of the program
had been destroyed. 159 Destroying such critical evidence could well
be seen as willfully avoiding knowledge of the salient facts. Under
such circumstances, a willful blindness instruction may be appro-
priate.160
V. THE BOUNDARIES OF CRIMINAL ESTOPPEL
Knowing acquiescence is only one of the potential limits of
criminal estoppel.161 While an affirmative misrepresentation wouldnormally be necessary in order to successfully assert the criminal
157. Id. at 1131 (citing United States v. Vesterso, 828 F.2d 1234, 1244-45
(8th Cir. 1987)).
158. 915 F. Supp. 1460, 1472-73 (D. Minn. 1996).
159. Id. at 1474-77.
160. The case of United States v. Race, 632 F.2d 1114 (4th Cir. 1980), illus-
trates the same principle in a knowing acquiescence context. In this case, a gov-
ernment contractor was prosecuted for submitting false and fraudulent invoices.
Id. at 1115. In reversing the convictions, the Fourth Circuit observed that the
government was on notice throughout the life of the contract as to how the de-
fendant interpreted the contract, and it concluded that the Navy should have ad-
vised the defendant if he was misconstruing the contract. Id. at 1121. While not
an example of the willful blindness instruction, Race illustrates the underlying
concept that the government may not be free to ignore circumstances of which it
has notice without suffering consequences.
161. See discussion supra Part IV.
23
Lundquist: "They Knew What We Were Doing?": he Evolution of the Criminal Es
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1997
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REV1EW
estoppel defense, '62 knowing acquiescence coupled with a duty to
speak out may create an alternative ground.1 6' This Part examines
some of the other limits that have been or should be placed on the
defense. These limits involve the inappropriateness of the defense
in connection with heinous crimes, the application of the defense
in specific intent crimes, and the determination of whether the de-
fense can be based upon statements made with actual authority and
apparent authority.
A. Threshold Limitations
Criminal estoppel does not constitute an excuse to do some-
thing unlawful. However, jurists have expressed a fear that the de-
fense will be used to permit such unlawfulness. Justices Black and
Clark, dissenting in Cox v. Louisiana, both expressed such a view.'
Justice Black noted that "a police chief cannot authorize violations
of his [s] tate's criminal laws,' 65 and Justice Clark said he "never
knew until today that a law enforcement official - city, state or na-
tional - could forgive a breach of the criminal laws."' 66 Moreover,
because ignorance of the law is no defense, 67 it would be regarded
as inconsequential that a government agent had rendered an erro-
neous interpretation of a law which the agent presumed a citizen
already knew.'1 But the presumption that every citizen knows the
162. See discussion supra Part III.
163. See discussion supra Part IV.
164. See 379 U.S. 559, 582 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 588 (Clark, J.,
dissenting). Another concern, over potential compromise of the separation of
powers, has led the Supreme Court to hold that agents of the executive branch
may not, on an ad hoc basis, override laws enacted by the legislative branch. See
Raoul Berger, Estoppel Against the Government, 21 U. CHI. L. REv. 680, 686 (1954).
165. Cox, 379 U.S. at 582 (Black,J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 588 (Clark, J., dissenting). Justice Clark punctuated his com-
ments by adding that he "missed that in my law school, in my practice and for the
two years while I was head of the Criminal Division of the Department ofJustice."
Id. at 588-89.
167. See Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991) (noting the gen-
eral rule that neither ignorance nor mistake of the law is a defense); see also
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 48 (1881) ("[E]very one must feel
that ignorance of the law could never be admitted as an excuse, even if the fact
could be proved by sight and hearing in every case.").
168. See United States v. Barker, 546 F.2d 940, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (ac-
knowledging that under a strict construction of the mistake of law rule, a recipi-
ent of a warrant is not excused from an unlawful search and seizure prosecution
by reliance upon a judicial determination as to probable cause, but that "in cer-
tain situations there is an overriding societal interest in having individuals rely on
the authoritative pronouncements of officials whose decisions we wish to see re-
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law has little basis in fact, especially with respect to laws that are ma-
lum prohibitum 69 or specialized or arcane laws such as administrative
regulations.
Despite these criticisms, criminal estoppel decisions do not ac-
tually hold that police may "excuse" or "forgive" violations of the
law. Rather, they are they premised on the belief that it is reason-
able to rely on an interpretation of the law by one who appears to
be in good position to provide reliable guidance. None of the
three seminal Supreme Court criminal estoppel cases deal with po-
lice agreeing to forgive or somehow disregard a known violation of
the law. Rather, in each case, law enforcement agents provided
views on how the law applied to the fact situation presented,' 70 i.e.,
how the defendant could conform his or her conduct to the re-
quirements of the law. In most criminal estoppel cases, the acqui-
escence is not a license to violate the law but rather advice on how
conduct may conform to the law.'7 ' Thus, the criticism that police
should not be permitted to forgive violations of the law is mis-
placed, for the cases show that this has not happened. 172
The essence of criminal estoppel is that the government,
through its words or actions, has led a defendant to believe that the
conduct at issue is not illegal and will not result in punishment. It
seems unlikely that the criminal estoppel defense could be used to
assert that conduct that was known to be illegal by both the defen-
spected").
169. Malum prohibitum is defined as "a thing which is wrong because prohib-
ited; an act which is not inherently immoral, but becomes so because its commis-
sion is expressly forbidden by positive law." BLAcK's LAw DICrIONARY 960 (6th ed.
1990). Compare malum in se, which is defined as an act that is inherently and
morally wrong. See id. at 959.
170. See, e.g., United States v. Pennsylvania Indus. Chem. Corp., 411 U.S.
655, 672-73 (1973) (allowing reliance on statements by the Army Corps of Engi-
neers); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 571 (1965) (allowing reliance on state-
ments by city's highest police officials); Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 437 (1959)
(allowing reliance upon opinion by Ohio Un-American Activities Commission).
171. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Indus. Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. at 674; Cox, 379 U.S.
at 569-72; Raley, 360 U.S. at 437-40; United States v. Hedges, 912 F.2d 1397, 1403-
04 (11th Cir. 1990); United States v. Tallmadge, 829 F.2d 767, 774 (9th Cir. 1987).
172. See, e.g., United States v. LaChapelle, 969 F.2d 632, 637 (8th Cir. 1992)
(holding that there must be an "explicit assurance of legality" for the defense to
succeed); United States v. Brebner, 951 F.2d 1017, 1025-26 (9th Cir. 1991) (re-
quiring evidence that a government official made some affirmative misrepresenta-
tion that the conduct in question was legal); United States v. Hurst, 951 F.2d 1490,
1499 (6th Cir. 1991) (stating that "mere nonfeasance in law enforcement" cannot
be "tantamount to official approval of [an] illegal act" and will not support the
estoppel defense).
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dant and police nevertheless was authorized.17 The exception to
this lies in those cases where the defendant claims he was assisting
the government in an undercover investigation - for example, set-
ting up drug deals - and therefore was allowed to engage in what
otherwise would have constituted criminal conduct.
7 4
B. Heinous Crimes
In cases of "heinous" criminal offenses, particularly those in-
volving "substantial personal injury," questions may be raised as to
the appropriateness of applying the doctrine of criminal estop-
pel. 7 5 The consequences of such crimes are so severe and the acts
so reprehensible that it is socially irresponsible to allow estoppel to
be tendered as an excuse in these cases. Further, in heinous
cases the law is rarely ambiguous, and the community moral stan-
dards so clear, that the wrongfulness of the act "should be apparent
even in the face of official misleading."1 77 Thus, a defendant ac-
cused of a heinous crime could not credibly claim that he believed
his act was in conformity in the typical case with the law as a result
of an official's statements or conduct.
178
But whether criminal estoppel is available as a defense turns
not so much on whether a crime is "heinous" or upon the policy
question of whether the lawbreaker should be "excused." Rather,
criminal estoppel turns on whether the defendant acted reasonably
in relying on the official pronouncement and whether the gov-
ernment should be estopped because of its communication of a
message that the conduct was not illegal.7 7 As noted above, these
173. See, e.g., United States v. Conley, 859 F. Supp. 909 (W.D. Pa. 1994)
(holding that even local compliance in licensing and nonprosecution of illegal
poker video games is not enough to insulate defendants from a statewide prohibi-
tion on the games).
174. See, e.g., United States v. Abcasis, 45 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1995) (opining
that if the defendant "commits forbidden acts... belie[ving] that he has in fact
been authorized to do so as an aid to law enforcement, then estoppel bars convic-
tion").
175. See Egger, supra note 12, at 1060-61.
176. See id. at 1061.
177. Id.
178. See id.
179. An exception to the rule against application of estoppel in heinous
crimes lies in cases of spiritual healing. In McKown (discussed above), the defen-
dants successfully raised the estoppel defense against charges of second-degree
manslaughter. State v. McKown, 475 N.W.2d 63, 68 (Minn. 1991); see also Her-
manson v. State, 604 So. 2d 775 (Fla. 1992) (holding that parents convicted of
felony child abuse and third-degree murder could rely on statutes that failed to
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are the subjective and objective touchstones of the defense, respec-
tively. 180
C. Specific Intent Crimes
Heinous crimes aside, criminal estoppel should apply in all
criminal cases irrespective of whether specific intent is an element
of the crime charged. In United States v. Hedges, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit reversed a conviction based on the trial court's erroneous ex-
clusion of the estoppel defense.' 8' The trial court had concluded
that estoppel would not apply since specific intent was not an is-
sue, 18 2 thereby conflating estoppel and criminal intent. The Elev-
enth Circuit disagreed, holding that criminal estoppel was indeed a
183
defense even where specific intent is not an element of the crime.
The court based its holding on the idea that estoppel "rests upon
principles of fairness rather than the defendant's mental state and
thus it may be raised even in strict liability offense cases.
"
,
4
Other circuits agree with this analysis. The Second Circuit has
held that criminal estoppel may apply even though the charge does
not require specific intent. ' 5 Likewise, the Ninth Circuit stressed
the due process aspect of the government's conduct when it con-
cluded that estoppel may be raised as a defense to a non-specific
intent charge. 86
give them notice as to when their reliance on spiritual healing lost its statutory
approval); Commonwealth v. Twitchell, 617 N.E.2d 609 (Mass. 1993) (allowing
parents charged with involuntary manslaughter to raise estoppel defense because
of their reliance on spiritual healing statute). In these cases, the statutes that
authorized some measure of spiritual healing did not authorize the deaths, or
"heinous" acts, per se; however, they did authorize, albeit unclearly, spiritual heal-
ing as a legal means of treatment on which the parents could rely.
180. See discussion supra Part II.
181. 912 F.2d 1397, 1406 (11th Cir. 1990).
182. Id. at 1400.
183. Id. at 1406.
184. Id. at 1405.
185. See United States v. Abcasis, 45 F.3d 39, 44 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that
criminal estoppel does not rely "solely on absence of criminal intent").
186. See United States v. Brebner, 951 F.2d 1017, 1025 (9th Cir. 1991); see
also United States v. Tallmadge, 829 F.2d 767, 773 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting that the
district court, in rejecting the defendant's "state of mind - due process defense,"
failed to consider whether the due process defense of criminal estoppel applied
to the case). In the dissent of TallmadgeJudge Kozinski wrote, "I fear the major-
ity's analysis reads scienter into statutes we have consistently held require none."
Id. at 781 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). Kozinski argued that because mental state is
irrelevant, "it matters not whether he came to that belief as a result of erroneous
advice or on his own." Id. at 782.
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A problem arises as to how estoppel applies if criminal intent
is also present. Estoppel is not simply the lack of criminal intent.
If it were, estoppel would be irrelevant in general intent or strict
liability cases. In other words, a defendant cannot have relied in
good faith on advice from law enforcement officials that conduct
was lawful and, at the same time, have acted with criminal intent. It
has been argued that these concepts cannot coexist and that crimi-
nal estoppel is superfluous in specific intent cases because specific
intent statutes protect against fundamentally unfair convictions.
8 7
While it seems logical that a defendant could not both act with
the intent to defraud and rely in good faith on official advice, it is
not clear that the defense of criminal estoppel is unnecessary or in-
applicable. If the estoppel defense were excluded, a court might
rule evidence about official advice irrelevant on the ground that
neither ignorance nor misunderstanding of the law is a defense.88
But even the trial court in Hiland admitted estoppel evidence and
gave an estoppel instruction to the jury. 1 9 Similarly, the Sixth Cir-
cuit not only found the defense of estoppel applicable in a specific
intent prosecution alleging fraud and false statement 90 but af-
firmed the pretrial dismissal of portions of the indictment.' 9' The
court ultimately found that the existence of the elements of estop-
pel rendered the government incapable of establishing intent as a
matter of law.
92
In light of these concerns, a jury instruction on the principle
of criminal estoppel may be advantageous to a defendant, even
though defendants usually assert a lack of criminal intent. Such an
instruction would focus attention on the issue of what the govern-
ment said or did and how that influenced the defendant.193 Far
from being "superfluous," the instruction would amplify the defen-
dant's presentation and reflect his theory of the defense. 94
Further, criminal estoppel is not irrelevant in specific intent
prosecutions because the defense focuses not only on the defen-
187. See Connelly, supra note 4, at 637-38.
188. See Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991).
189. See United States v. Hiland, 909 F.2d 1114, 1125-26 (8th Cir. 1990).
190. See United States v. Levin, 973 F.2d 463, 464 (6th Cir. 1992).
191. See id. at 470.
192. See id. at 469-70.
193. See supra Part IV.A (discussing when government knowledge is enough
in cases of knowing acquiescence).
194. A defendant is entitled to have a theory of the defense instruction
submitted to the jury when supported by the facts and the law. See, e.g., United
States v. Casperson, 773 F.2d 216, 223 (8th Cir. 1985).
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dant's mental intent, 95 but on the government's words and ac-
tions. 96 Because of this objective due process aspect to the defense,
it is not identical to the defense of lack of criminal intent. The de-
fendant is entitled to have the finder of fact consider both his lack
of criminal intent as well as the government's conduct in its delib-
erations. Therefore, for this reason and the others discussed, the
defense of criminal estoppel should be available in specific intent,
general intent, and strict liability offenses where it applies.
D. Actual Versus Apparent Authority
Another limitation on criminal estoppel concerns the author-
ity of the government official upon whom the defendant relies.
1198The government official must have actual, 97 apparent,9 or some
other level of authority to make the representation upon which the
estoppel defense is based. The reasonable reliance element of
criminal estoppel is particularly dependent upon the official's level
of authority. Drawing upon two examples, one relating to firearm
possession and the other to drug dealing, this Part examines these
questions of authority and the inconsistency of the holdings.
At the most fundamental level, one could argue that an official
never will have the actual authority to make a representation that
forms the basis of the estoppel defense. In other words, no gov-
ernment official is authorized to excuse a violation of the law. Ac-
cordingly, the inquiry shifts to whether a defendant's mistaken but
reasonable belief that he was authorized to violate the law is suffi-
cient to invoke the defense of estoppel199 However, some courts
have stated that there can be no estoppel when the agent lacks
authority to bind the government.
195. See, e.g., Levin, 973 F.2d at 469-70 (upholding a dismissal where the
government's representations negated any of the defendant's possible criminal
intent).
196. See, e.g., United States v. Hedges, 912 F.2d 1397, 1405 (11th Cir. 1990)
(stating that the holding "rests upon principles of fairness rather than the defen-
dant's mental state").
197. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 7 (1958) ("Authority is the
power of the agent to affect the legal relations of the principal by acts done in ac-
cordance with the principal's manifestations of consent to him.").
198. See id. ("Apparent authority is the power to affect the legal relations of
another person by transactions with third persons, professedly as agent for the
other, arising from and in accordance with the other's manifestations to such
third persons.").
199. See United States v. Abcasis, 45 F.3d 39, 44 (2d Cir. 1995).
200. See, e.g., United States v. Spires, 79 F.3d 464, 466-67 (5th Cir. 1996);
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Rather than judging whether an agent has the actual authority
to bind the government, the issue should be framed as whether the
official had the apparent authority to make the pronouncement
and whether the defendant's reliance was reasonable. Thus, the
issue of authority turns on a mixed fact determination of (1)
whether the agent had some colorable authority to render the ad-
vice, and (2) whether the defendant's reliance was reasonable un-
der the circumstances.
1. Possession of Firearms
Courts have split on the question of whether it is a defense to
the charge of possession of a firearm that a knowledgeable official
advised the defendant that he could possess a gun. In United States
v. Tailmadge, the Ninth Circuit held that a private gun dealer, li-
censed by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF),
had apparent authority to advise a customer - erroneously - that
he lawfully could purchase rifles because his felony conviction had
been reduced to misdemeanor status under California law.20' The
court noted that had such advice been given by an ATF agent, es-
toppel clearly would apply.202  Under agency law, the licensed
dealer was empowered to "gather[] and dispens[e] ... information
on the purchase of firearms."2 0 3 In rejecting the defense, the dis-
sent stressed that the dealer was neither a federal employee nor
authorized to speak for the government. 20 4 The majority rebutted
this argument by relying not only on the firearms dealer's state-
ments, but also on similar statements made by a state court judge,
the prosecuting attorney, and the defense attorney.205
S• 206
In United States v. Austin, the Eighth Circuit refused to find
actual authority and rejected criminal estoppel in a similar case in
which a pawn shop clerk dispensed both guns and advice to a
felon. The court found that the clerk's erroneous advice that the
defendant lawfully could consummate the transaction, regardless
United States v. Browning, 630 F.2d 694, 702 (10th Cir. 1980).
201. 829 F.2d 767, 774 (9th Cir. 1987).
202. Id.
203. Id. at 777 (Kozinski,J., dissenting).
204. Id. Judge Kozinski added, "[T]he court today reaches ajust result. But
it does so at too high a price, for this is a case where 'justice to the individual is
rightly outweighed by the larger interests on the other side of the scales.'" Id. at
775 (KozinskiJ., dissenting) (quoting HOLMES, supra note 167, at 48).
205. Id. at 775.
206. 915 F.2d 363 (8th Cir. 1990).
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of the defendant's felony status, was insufficient to invoke estop-
pel.2 °7 The court ruled that even though the clerk was a federally
licensed gun dealer 20 and dealers are required by their license to
enforce the law,2 °9 these factors do not "transform them into gov-
ernment officials, at least for purposes of the entrapment by estop-
pel defense."
2 10
The Eighth Circuit is not alone in rejecting criminal estoppel
in these situations. The Fourth Circuit has held that advice from a
state court judge to a felon that he could hunt with a gun would
not be a defense to felony possession charges.21 The court ex-
plained that because "the government that advises and the gov-
ernment that prosecutes are not the same," the criminal estoppel
defense would not be available. 2 Again, while the licensed mer-
chant of a sporting goods store or hardware store is a state agent
empowered to issue a hunting license, that agent lacks the power to
restore the felon's civil rights merely by issuing such a license. 3
Even where criminal estoppel is legally available, the advice
must be sufficiently clear and consistent so as to justify reliance as
reasonable.1 4 A "mixed message" from a government agent that a
defendant should cooperate with the government and retain his
guns, but that it would be illegal were he to do so, was not enough
to invoke estoppel, particularly where a defendant continued to
possess guns after the arranged cooperation had terminated.2 0
The question, naturally, is whether the defendant received a consis-
tently misleading message from several sources or messages about
216the legality of a certain behavior.
207. Id. at 366. The court stated that "[i]t is the authority, whether appar-
ent or actual, of the government official that is crucial to the entrapment by es-
toppel defense." Id. (citing United States v. Tallmadge, 829 F.2d 767, 777 & n.2
(9th Cir. 1987) (Kozinski,J., dissenting)).
208. Id. at 366-67.
209. Id. at 366.
210. Id. at 367 (citing Tallmadge, 829 F.2d at 778 (KozinskiJ., dissenting)).
211. See United States v. Etheridge, 932 F.2d 318 (4th Cir. 1991).
212. Id. at 321 (citing United States v. Bruscantini, 761 F.2d 640, 641-42
(1lth Cir. 1985)).
213. Seeid. at 322.
214. See Tallmadge, 829 F.2d at 775 (noting the defendant's reasonable reli-
ance on the firearms dealer's misleading affirmation, his attorney's legal opinion,
and comments by the trial judge and deputy district attorney).
215. See United States v. Smith, 940 F.2d 710, 715 (1st Cir. 1991).
216. See id. (comparing the facts of a successful estoppel claim with the ul-
timately unsuccessful claim in Smith).
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2. Dealing Drugs and Contraband
Drug prosecutions also raise questions concerning officials'
authority. Defendants are sometimes encouraged to deal in con-
traband of one sort or another by government agents as part of an
investigation. Even if the agents lacked the authority to enroll the
defendants as cooperating witnesses in the investigation, the de-
fense of criminal estoppel should be allowed so long as reliance is
reasonable.
In United States v. Abcasis,217 the Second Circuit held that actual
authority, while instructive, is not necessary to criminal estoppel.
The defendants allegedly were authorized by DEA agents to deal in
narcotics.218 At trial, the court instructed the jury to acquit if it
found that the defendants were in fact authorized, but it refused to
instruct that it would be a defense if the defendants were found to
have acted in the mistaken belief that they had authorization.219
The Second Circuit reversed, holding that the defense applies
when a defendant "commits forbidden acts in the mistaken but
reasonable, good[-]faith belief that he has in fact been authorized
to do so. '220 The court stressed that estoppel does not depend
solely on the absence of criminal intent or on actual authority.
22 1
Rather, the defense "focuses on the conduct of the government leading
the defendant to believe reasonably that he was authorized to do
the act forbidden by law.,
222
In United States v. Clegg,22 3 the Ninth Circuit also looked to the
conduct of the government, as well as the context of the activity, in
analyzing an estoppel defense. While the defendant was teaching
school in Pakistan, U.S. officials asked him to help smuggle guns to• 224
Afghan rebels. When he was later prosecuted for providing the
requested assistance, 25 the defendant raised the criminal estoppel
defense.2 2 6 The Ninth Circuit found this appropriate.22 The courtreasoned that since the officials were high-ranking and were inter-
217. 45 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1995).
218. Id. at 42.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 43.
221. Id. at 44.
222. Id. (emphasis added).
223. 846 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir. 1988).
224. Id. at 1222.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 1222-23.
227. Id. at 1224.
[Vol. 23
32
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 4 [1997], Art. 1
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol23/iss4/1
1997] EVOLUTION OF THE CRIMINAL ESTOPPEL DEFENSE 875
preting the uncertain application of U.S. law abroad, adequate
authority was present, availing the defendant of the criminal estop-
pel defense."8
A government official perhaps never has the actual authority
to advise that a law may be broken, but she or he may be clothed
with the apparent authority to make such statements." 9 Whether
the defense is viable may turn on such factors as whether the agent
is a government official, what position the agent holds, and
whether providing advice on legal matters is part of that position.
Reliance on the advice must also be reasonable: Was it credible?
Was it consistent with other information? Was it straightforward or
"mixed"? Was the advice in the nature of an interpretation, as op-
posed to an instruction to violate a known legal duty? The answer
to these questions, in large measure, will determine the success of
the defense.
VI. THE DEFENSE AS A QUESTION OF LAW AND A QUESTION OF FACT
The court must decide, as a matter of law, whether estoppel is
available as a defense. If the defense is available, the finder of fact
must determine whether the elements of estoppel have been
proven. For instance, the Supreme Court held in Pennsylvania In-
dustrial Chemical Co. that an error of law would occur in denying a
criminal defendant the right to present factual evidence that the
government misled it into believing that its actions did not violate
the law. In other words, where the defense is legally available, a
factual inquiry must follow.
The burden of proving estoppel is on the defendant, but he or
she is not required "to pass a credibility test to have [the defense]
presented to the jury."23' Even though the court may have good
reason to be doubtful, when the evidence submitted by the defen-
dant establishes a prima facie defense, the matter must be submit-
228. Id. at 1223-24. The court found Tailmadge controlling: "If Tallmadge
was entitled to rely upon the representations of a gun dealer.., we can hardly
deny the same defense to Clegg." Id. at 1224.
229. Cf United States v. Abcasis, 45 F.3d 39, 43-44 (2d Cir. 1995) (focusing
on the conduct of the government as evidence of apparent authority was absent
or questionable).
230. SeeUnited States v. Pennsylvania Indus. Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. 655, 675
(1973).
231. Abcasis, 45 F.3d at 44 (citing United States v. Austin, 915 F.2d 363, 365
(8th Cir. 1990)).
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ted to the jury.232
In rare cases where relevant facts are not in dispute, criminal
estoppel may be applied as a matter of law.2 3  For example, the
Sixth Circuit in Levin affirmed the pretrial dismissal of an indict-
ment based upon undisputed operative facts21 establishing that
government agents declared a sales promotion to be legal, that the
defendants relied upon those pronouncements, that the reliance
was reasonable and, accordingly, that prosecution would be un-f " 235
fair. Faced with similarly undisputed operative facts, the Minne-
sota Supreme Court affirmed a pretrial dismissal of an indictment
in McKown.3 6 In the normal case, however, the issue will be for the
jury. In those cases, an appropriate jury instruction should be pro-
vided laying out the elements of estoppel. 37
VII. CONCLUSION
The doctrine of criminal estoppel has evolved into a recog-
nized defense over the last forty years. It draws on principles of
fairness that prohibit the government from prosecuting a crime
that one of its agents has authorized, and its armor is strengthened
by the notice requirements of constitutional due process.
Those constitutional protections are most pronounced in the
United States Supreme Court's application of the doctrine. At
lower levels of the judicial system, the scope of criminal estoppel
232. See id.
233. See United States v. Levin, 973 F.2d 463 (6th Cir. 1992).
234. Id. at 467.
235. Id. at 468.
236. See discussion supra Part III.C.
237. In United States v. Hiland, 909 F.2d 1114 (8th Cir. 1990), the court
quoted the following jury instruction, which the defendants did not challenge:
[The defendants] have introduced evidence that the regulation,
policies and practices of the United States Food and Drug Administra-
tion led these defendants to believe that E-Ferol Aqueous Solution did
not require an approved new drug application, an NDA, before it could
be legally introduced into interstate commerce.
There has been evidence that E-Ferol Aqueous Solution was a single
entity vitamin drug which was similar or related to other vitamin prod-
ucts that themselves were not the subject of an approved new drug ap-
plication, and that it [sic] had been marketed prior to 1938.
[The defendants] were led to believe that E-Ferol Aqueous Solution
could be used on equal terms with these other unapproved Vitamin E
products.
Id. at 1126 n.15. This instruction seems to be more in the nature of a theory of
the defense instruction rather than one which sets forth the elements of estoppel.
[Vol. 23
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varies by jurisdiction. These variations between jurisdictions and
the fact-specific inquiries surrounding the criminal estoppel de-
fense may make its application somewhat unpredictable. However,
given today's climate of regulatory prosecution, criminal estoppel
undoubtedly will continue to evolve, and its usage will endure.
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